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THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON A
JOINT PRODUCT MODEL OF SMUGGLING
ABSTRACT
Extending the seminal work of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) on
smuggling, Pitt (1981) developed a joint export smuggling model to
investigate the welfare effect of illegal transactions.

This paper

develops an extension of Pitt's original model which allows many of
the interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be re
examined within a joint product model of smuggling framework.

The

extension is made through the following modifications to Pitt's
assumptions: 1) firms that export are free to engage in joint
product smuggling or strictly legal trade; and 2) uncertainty is
introduced into the model via active government enforcement.
The modifications enable the model to reexamine the ambiguous
welfare results derived in the papers by Pitt, and Bhagwati and
Hansen.

The model explains why the ambiguous welfare results were

derived and demonstrates that the welfare effect of smuggling can
indeed be positive, even if smuggling incurs a real resource cost.

I. Introduction.
The

paper

by

Pitt

(1981)

on

illegal

transactions

in

international trade questioned the results of the seminal paper on
illegal transactions by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973). The purpose of
this paper is to explore how Pitt's welfare results are affected
when risk and the firm's attitude toward risk are introduced in

conjunction with the firm's freedom to choose between strictly

legal trade and joint product smuggling. The modified model of

joint product smuggling developed in this paper permits many of the
interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be re

evaluated within a joint product framework.

This is accomplished

by allowing government enforcement to play an active role in the
model without incurring a real resource cost to combat smuggling. 1
Active enforcement generates a crime theoretic framework for the
analysis of joint product smuggling in this paper. 2

In this essay Pitt's model of joint product export smuggling

is modified to incorporate active government enforcement of the
smuggling laws.

Active enforcement is the assumption used to

introduce uncertainty into the joint export smuggling model. The

paper then develops a decision mechanism which evaluates the

uncertainty and provides a set of decision rules for the firm to
It is a common assumption in the smuggling literature that
enforcement effort against smuggling incurs a zero real resource
cost because the legal system of country is already in place.
Thus, increased enforcement effort against smuggling requires only
a reallocation of resources within the legal system.
1

Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to introduce
the crime theoretic approach to the analysis of smuggling.
2

1

follow in making its decision to smuggle or engage in strictly
The firm's attitude toward risk affects this

legal trade. 3

decision process. 4
include

the

punishment

real

in

its

The model requires the smuggling firm to
resource

costs

of

output price.

smuggling

These two

and

expected

factors

production and output price if the firm smuggles.

affect

The firm's

smuggling decision determines the long run equilibrium domestic
price ratio.

The results of the model indicate that: 1) it is the

firm's attitude toward risk in conjunction with the real resource
cost of smuggling that determines the welfare effect of smuggling;
2) if firms are risk neutral or risk averse and they decide to
smuggle,

then

smuggling

is

welfare

enhancing

under

certain

conditions; and 3) the assumption of a significant real resource
cost is only a partial explanation for the ambiguous welfare
results found in the earlier smuggling literature. 5
II. Assumptions.
The concept of a firm decision mechanism which determines
whether a firm smuggles or not was first developed in a paper by
Fausti (1992).
3

Smuggling models which incorporate variable firm risk
preference can be found in papers by Scholer (1989) and Fausti
(1992).
4

In the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1981),
Bhagwati (1981), and Martin and Panagariya (1984), the real
resource cost of smuggling is the only factor responsible for the
Sheikh (1989) argues that ambiguous
ambiguous welfare results.
welfare results can only occur if firms are assumed risk
preferring. Scholer (1989) and Fausti (1992) argue that if the
attitude toward risk varies over the traded goods industry,
smuggling can be strictly welfare enhancing.
5

2

The basic assumptions of Pitt's model of smuggling are the
starting point for this paper. Pitt assumes the small country case

The country produces two traded

with the terms of trade fixed.

goods, an exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing primary
factors purchased in competitive markets. Production and trade are

carried out by identical firms. Legal and illegal trade in exports
The law of one price holds in the

is carried out by the same firm.
domestic economy.

The following additional assumptions are made so that a model

of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1) firms
that smuggle may not incur a significant real resource cost; 6

2)

smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their utility functions

are embodied in the country's social welfare function; 3) export

taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4) firms must bear the

risk of illegal activity and they cannot insure against criminal
penalties; 5) exporting firms have a choice between strictly legal
trade or smuggling, with the choice based on profit maximization;
and, 6) if the domestic exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will
then produce a joint product, and legal trade will act as a cloak

The firm can use four methods to

for the firm's illegal activity.

smuggle exports: a) under-invoicing of exports; b) falsely declared

6
Cooper (1974) and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) argue that
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society
over legal trade.

3

exports;

c) under-assessment of exports;

and d)

clandestine

smuggling of unreported production. 7
III. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling.
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section,
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a modified
Pitt smuggling function,

(1)

s* = G (L, S).

The variable (S*) is the quantity of good (X) made ready to be
smuggled. The variable (S*) in this model is defined as exports
made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or, in other
words, smuggling attempted. The variable (L) is the quantity of
good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good (X) input
into smuggling activity.

The function (G) is strictly concave and

a twice differentiable linear homogeneous function.

The function

(G) is assumed to have the following properties:
Gt �

o,

1 � G8

Gu.
�

s o,

(2)

0, G.. S O,

(3)

G (O, S)=O,

(4 )

G (L, O)=O,

(5)

s-s* � o, acs-s*)/aL <O, acs-s*)/as >o.

(6)

Assumption (2) states that the marginal smuggling product of
legal trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in
(L).

Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling

input (S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in
1
Deardorff and Stolper (1990) discuss the widespread use of
smuggling method (d) in a number of African countries.

4

actual amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the
marginal product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that
legal trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the probability
of detection is one.

Assumption (5) states that firms can choose

to engage in legal trade only.

Assumption (6) prohibits the real

resource cost of smuggling from being negative. The real resource
cost of smuggling (s-s*) is the smuggler's selling cost in excess
of its legal trade alternative selling cost (excluding taxes). It
is assumed that the actual magnitude of smuggling•s real resource
cost is exogenous to the model. However, a change in one of the
endogenous variables (L) or (S), affects the marginal resource cost
of smuggling. A one-unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus, reduces
the marginal real resource cost of smuggling.

A one-unit increase

in (S), ceteris paribus, increases the marginal real resource cost
of smuggling.
In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is the
direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is modeled. 8
A negative welfare effect results from an excessive real resource
cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant real resource
cost produces a positive welfare effect.

As an example, Pitt

assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of either penalties
and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource cost and penalties
and confiscation.

His welfare result is ambiguous because the

Again see Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1981), Martin
and Panagariya (1984), Scholer (1989), Sheikh (1989), and Fausti
(1992).
8

5

composition of the cost mix is unknown.

We alter Pitt's assumption

and assume that the difference between (S) and (S*) is a real
resource cost incurred from the use of cloaking tactics employed to
evade detection. 9
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p) , (l�p�O)
such that (p=l) if (L=O) .

The expected value of illegal goods

intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p. pf. s*) or (Pf•s*)

if (L=O) . The variable (Pf) is the world price of exports. The
expected

value of successful smuggling is [ (1-p) Pf•S*].

The

variable (F) is a multiple of the value of intercepted illegal
goods which is imposed as a fine,

The expected cost of

(F�l) .

interception to the smuggler is (p•F•Pf•s*) and is at least (Pf•s*)
if (L=O) . Expected smuggling revenue net of interception cost is

equal to [ (1-p•F) . pf. s*] and is non-positive if (L=O) .

The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good
at the border for the smuggling firm is E[P8

]

= (1-p•F) •Pf, and is

non-positive if (L=O) . The expected value of revenue per input unit
of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is
E[P8]• (S*/s) = (1-p•F) •Pf• (S*/s) , and is non-positive if (L=O) . The
expected value for the output price per unit of legally exported
goods is E[pLJ

= pf. (1-t)

distorted price for exports.

= pL,

and represents the legal tax

The variable (t) denotes the export

The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of:
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods; and 2)
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the
country via clandestine ports.
9

6

It is assumed the firm knows the values of these risk

tax.

factors.

It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm can

engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output at the

legal domestic export tax distorted price (pL), as implied by the

assumption G (L, 0)=0. 10 If the firm decides to smuggle, it receives
the weighted average price for its total output.
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product

illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery.
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables
(p,

y•, F).

The probability of apprehension

not

cloak

(p) ,

is determined by

It is assumed the firm's probability of being

the government.
caught is

(p )

if it engages in cloaking activities.

its

illegal

activity,

apprehension is equal to one.

then

the

If it does

probability

of

The variable (F) determines the

monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the
government if it is caught in the illegal act of smuggling.

are considered a transfer to the government.
profit

maximization

production

in

possibility

production
curve

implies

where

the

Fines

As in Pitt's paper;
producing
marginal

transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*).

on

the

rate

of

The variable

(Y9 ) represents profits from joint product export trade.
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers.
profit for the smuggling firm is given by equation (7),

Expected

Strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7)
when it is assumed S=O.
10

7

E(Y 8)=Pt•G(L,S) - (p)•F•Pt•G(L,S) + pt. (1-t)•L - P*•(L+S)•11 (7)
The

term

[Pt•G(L,S)

(p)•F•P t•G(L,S)]

denotes

expected

smuggling revenues; pt•(l-t)•L represents revenues for legal trade.
As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in the long
run. Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p* generates an
expression for the long run equilibrium domestic price ratio as a
weighted average of prices received for goods legally exported in
conjunction with goods illegally exported:
p* = [(1-p•F)•Pt•(S*)]/(L+S) + [Pt•(l-t)•(L)]/(L+S).

(8)

The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in strictly
legal trade (S=O) or engage in smuggling and produce a joint
product (L+S*) will determine the long run equilibrium domestic
price ratio (DPR). If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price disparity"
result is generated (P*>PL).
IV. The Role of Uncertainty in the Smuggling Decision.
The act of smuggling incurs a risk. The exporting firm's
attitude toward the risk will effect its decision to smuggle or
engage

in

strictly

legal

trade.

This

section

applies

the

methodology developed by Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) to address
the uncertainty issue in this paper.
Joint product illegal trade profit represents an uncertain
prospect and legal trade profit represents a certain prospect. The
term (ff) represents the difference between the expected value of
illegal profit and legal profit; it follows that there exists a
11

The first order conditions can be found in appendix (A).
8

(ff*) such that the firm is indifferent between legal and illegal
trade.

The value of (ff*) depends on the firm's attitude toward

risk.

Applying Pratt's results we can define (ff*) as a risk

premium and the functional form of (ff*) is given in equation (9),
ff/ = (1/2) ·VAR(Y) • -{U" (Y) + U' (Y)}.

(9)

The measure of absolute risk aversion is defined as

-[U" (Y) /U' (Y)],

and is employed as the measure of the firm's

attitude toward risk in this section. The following conditions
arise from equation (9): 1) the value of (ff*) for the firm will be
negative if (U">O); 2) positive if (U"<O); and 3) zero if (U"=O).
This implies, respectively, that the firm prefers, averts, or is
neutral toward risk. In this paper the risk preferring case is not
addressed. The variable (ff*) represents the insurance premium the

firm would be willing to pay if it could insure itself against
criminal penalties.

Therefore, (ff*) represents the minimum value

of risk premium necessary to make the firm indifferent to
smuggling.

This implies that, in equilibrium, at the margin,

smugglers that are risk averse earn higher profits than in legal
activities. Smugglers who are risk neutral earn the same amount of

profits as in legal trade.12

Hence,

(ff*)

Cooper's "threshold of law abidingness. "13

serves as proxy for
Whenever (ff>ff*), then

the firm will become involved in smuggling.
Becker (1968) used this approach to examine the effect of
uncertainty on criminal behavior.
12

See Cooper (1974), for a discussion of the factors which
influence a firm to smuggle or continue in legal trade, p.186.
13

9

In the paper by Sheikh (1989), a positive equilibrium level of
economic profit is considered a "reward" to smugglers who are risk
averse

as

compensation

for

the

mental

anguish

incurred

by

participating in a risky venture. In this paper, the risk premium
(v*) represents the smuggler's compensation. As in Sheikh's paper,
there is a unique perfectly competitive equilibrium in this model
where the cost associated with the amount of mental anguish is
exactly equal to the reward for risk (v*).
Assume the exporting firm reacts to uncertainty as described
above. Long run economic profit is then equal to zero for the risk
neutral firm.

It follows that economic profit is positive for the

risk averse firm. This assumption modifies equation (7) and long
run equilibrium expected profit for the smuggling firm is:
E (Y•)

=

pf•G (L,S) - (p)•F•Pf•G (L,S) + Pf• (l-t)•L p*• (L+S) = v*.

(10)

Solving equation (10) for p* generates a new expression for the
(DPR):
p* = [ (1-p•F)•Pf• (S*)] / (L+S) + [Pf• (l-t)• (L)] / (L+S) v* / (L+S)•

(11)

Long run equilibrium domestic relative price is now a function

of the weighted average price of joint product smuggling, which
includes the risk premium (v*).

The firm's decision to engage in

joint product smuggling or strictly legal trade is determined by
the firm's decision criteria condition:
max[Pf• (l-t), pf• (S*+S)• (1-p•F) - v*/S].
10

(12)

Condition C12) states that if the expected value of revenue per
input unit of smuggled good, less the per unit risk premium, is
greater than the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling
CS) through legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P*• 14 If

not, then the DPR=pL. The following statements outline the firm's
decision mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the
strictly legal trade alternative:

pf.s*•Cl-p•F) - 7r*

pf•S•C1-t),

if pf· cs* ts>·c1-p·F>- 7r* /S < pf.Cl-t), then S=O, DPR is pL,

if pf· CS*/S)•Cl-p•F)- 7r*/S > pf.Cl-t), then S>O, DPR is p*,

C13)
C14)
ClS)

if pf· cs*/S)•Cl-p•F)- 7r*/S = pf·Cl-t),
then the type of firm activity is indeterminate, pL=P*.

C16)

Statement C13) compares total revenue CPf•S*•Cl-p•F)) coming from
illegal trade minus the risk premium to the total revenue CPf•S•Clt)) which would be earned by channeling CS) through legal channels.
Statements C14-16) are derived from C13). 15
Under the assumption of risk neutrality CJr*=O) and a real cost
associated with smuggling cs-s*>O), the CDPR) is determined by the
firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal trade.

The

firm's choice is based on the decision criteria found in statements
Condition C12) is derived from equation Cll). Condition
C12) makes a comparison of revenue coming from illegal trade
CPf•S*•Cl-t)) to the revenue which would be earned by channeling
illegal goods through legal channels, CPf•S•Cl-t)).
14

The introduction of the firm's decision mechanism to the
analysis of smuggling eliminates the possibility of obtaining the
strictly ambiguous welfare results found in Bhagwati and Srinivasan
C1974) or Pitt C1981).
15

11

(14-15).

statement (16) reveals the necessary condition for the

coexistence of legal trade only firms (S=O) with firms that smuggle
(joint product exports). This model, unlike models in the previous
literature, requires the smuggling firm to account for the real

resource cost incurred by smuggling in the firm's output price

structure. However, if the firm decides to smuggle, welfare may not

be enhanced due to the real resource cost.

The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal to

pf. (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated with
smuggling evaluated at world prices.

The negative welfare effect

can be divided into two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and
therefore production; and 2) a loss in government revenue.

The

negative price effect (1-p •F). pf. (s-s*) is internalized by the

smuggling firm and is reflected in the firm's output price.
Therefore, the negative price effect which is generated by just a
proportion of the real resource cost is taken into consideration
when the firm makes its decision to smuggle or engage in strictly
legal trade.

The welfare loss due to a real resource cost not

accounted for in the smuggling firm's output price is the value of

lost government confiscation revenues that would have accrued if
(s-s*i:::so). The welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can be
considered a dead weight loss to society (DWL) and it is equal to:
DWL = (p •F). pf. (s-s*).

(17)

The overall welfare effect of smuggling depends on whether
additional revenues accruing to the firm from the act of smuggling
12

outweigh the negative welfare effect of the dead weight loss due to
the real resource cost.
A comparison of the welfare level attained when all risk
neutral firms smuggle to the welfare level achieved when all firms
engage in strictly legal trade can be determined by answering two
questions: 1)

what effect does smuggling have on the domestic

price ratio; and 2) is the total social value of exported goods
smuggled (S*) greater than the total social value of those exports
if (S) were shipped through legal channels?

The first question is

answered by statements (14) through (16) , smuggling will only occur
if expected smuggling revenue is greater than or equal to legal
trade revenue, which implies (P*�pL) .

The second question can be

answered by first assuming (P*>PL) , then by rearranging statement
(1 3 )

I

pt. 5*. (1-p•F) - fl* - pt. 5. (1-t) > 0. 16

(18)

If (P*>pL) , then (18) states that the smuggling firm receives a
higher total value for its exports by engaging in illegal trade.
The firm, however, does not consider the (DWL) to society generated
by the real resource cost associated with smuggling.

For smuggling

to increase the total social value of exports in comparison to the
strictly legal trade alternative, statement (19) must be true,
pt. 5* . (1-p•F) - fl* - pt. 5. (1-t) - pt. (p•F) • (s-s*) > O.

If statement (19)

(19)

is true, then the change in total revenues

generated from smuggling over non-smuggling is greater than (DWL) ,
16

(fl*=O) •

Note, when it is assumed that firms are risk neutral then
13

and the total social value of exports increases.

Simplifying (19)

we have (20),
pf· cs*/s) > pf. (1-t) + pf. (p ·F) + fl*/s.

c20)

In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement (15) , it is clear
that (20) is the stronger condition.

Which indicates that it is

possible for firms to decide to engage in smuggling and have the
act of smuggling reduce the total social value of exports.

If

however, the per unit revenue of smuggling input is greater than
the combined per unit value of:

1)

the legal trade revenue

alternative for (S) ; and 2) expected punishment, then smuggling
increases the social value of exports. We can now assert that
statement (20) is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk
neutral firms to engage in smuggling and increase the total social
value of exports over the non-smuggling alternative.
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling,
however, must also consider the effect smuggling has on the (DPR) .
For this purpose an indirect utility function (V) is introduced. It
is assumed (V) can be used as a proxy for social welfare.

Assume

welfare is a function of the (DPR) and income (Y) . It is assumed
that an improvement (increase) in (DPR) increases social welfare.
It is assumed that income is positively related to the total social
value of exports. The total social value of exports includes both
private and public sector revenues generated by the export trade.
Assume all other income sources are held constant and enforcement
effort

does

not

incur

a

real

14

resource

cost.

Under

these

assumptions the following indirect utility function is defined as
V (DPR, Y), and has the following properties; av/aDPR>O, av/aY>0. 17
If statement

(15) is true then ·firms will smuggle.

If

condition (20) is also satisfied, then the welfare effect will be
positive.

This is due to the fact that the change in domestic

price ratio and the change in the total social value of exports are
both positive, and welfare improves via the social welfare function
The welfare effect of smuggling, however, is ambiguous if

(V).

condition (20) is not met. This ambiguous result is the outcome of
the (DPR) still increasing, but (Y) declining. This set of results
establishes a stronger argument in favor of smuggling than the
ambiguous welfare results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen, and
Pitt.

Their ambiguous welfare results are the consequence of

smuggling either having a strictly positive or strictly negative
effect on welfare, depending on the magnitude of the real resource
cost.

Given that the magnitude of the real resource cost is

unknown in their papers, they conclude that the welfare effect is
ambiguous.

In this paper, smuggling does not have a strictly

negative effect on welfare.

The welfare effect is strictly

positive or ambiguous when the real resource cost exceeds the costs
associated with legal trade.

In the joint product model, smuggling

activity will become indeterminate or end before the welfare effect
The indirect utility function (V) has the following
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all DPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is
non-decreasing in (DPR) and (Y); and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree
zero in (DPR) and (Y). It should be noted that an increase in the
(DPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a
discussion of the properties of the indirect utility function see
Varian (1984).
17

15

of smuggling becomes strictly negative.

Unlike their analysis,

however, this paper provides the mathematical condition necessary

for the ambiguous welfare result to occur, otherwise smuggling has
an unambiguous positive welfare effect.

smuggling coexisting with strictly legal trade can occur when

(P*=F'). If smuggling is coexisting with strictly legal trade, then
the change in the domestic price ratio is zero and the change in
the total social value of exports is negative as (19) indicates
(P t •s* •{l-p •F) - pf •S • (l-t)=O).

since

In this situation {16),

smuggling either ends or the welfare effect is negative. However,

in this case the existence of strictly legal trade and/or smuggling
is indeterminate.

This result mirrors that attained by Bhagwati

and Hansen when (P*=F'), and their conclusion of "the less smuggling
the better" holds.
If it is assumed that the real resource cost of smuggling is

insignificant

{S*/S=l),

with

penalties

and

confiscation

representing the significant cost to the smuggling firm, then
Pitt• s strictly positive welfare result is reproduced in this

model. 18 statements (13) and (15) indicate that the firm will

smuggle only if export revenue earned from smuggling is greater

than export revenue from strictly legal trade, in this case the
welfare effect is strictly positive. Statement {16) expresses that
legal-trade-only firms (S=O) may coexist with firms that smuggle
This is a strong assumption for this model, and is made only
to discuss Pitt's results under this assumption within the context
of this model.
18

16

(joint product) only when the value of expected punishment equals

the export tax, which implies the export price received from both
types of trade are equal.

If smuggling exists in this situation,

then the welfare effect is neutral. This situation allows both
types of firm activity to coexist in the Pitt framework.

The implications of these results are: 1) if the expected

punishment associated with smuggling is less than the export tax,
all firms smuggle; 2) without a significant real resource cost

associated with smuggling, the welfare level for the "all firms

smuggling" situation is greater than the non-smuggling alternative
due to smuggling•s relative price effect; and 3) the welfare effect

of smuggling is dependent on the level of expected punishment
(p·F)

. 1,

In the previous example of a risk neutral firm not incurring
a real resource cost, it was demonstrated that the firm was
indifferent in the choice between strictly legal trade or smuggling
when

(t

=

p •F) •

For this specific case the actual profit

differential (ff) is equal to zero, and the risk premium (ff*}
required by the risk neutral firm is equal to zero.

The risk

averse firm, however, requires (fl':i:!:ff*) to engage in smuggling.
suppose for example, that the actual risk premium being generated

when a firm smuggles (S*) in lieu of exporting (S) through legal
channels is equal to:
Without a significant real resource cost to smuggling, the
cost of smuggling to the firm represents just a transfer of revenue
to the government. The aggregate rate of transformation in trade in
this situation is the free trade terms of trade as in Pitt's paper.
19
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(21)

For the risk averse firm ("*) is positive. If (") is greater than
("*), then the firm will smuggle as indicated by statement (15).
The effect of smuggling on social welfare depends on if the risk
premium earned by smugglers is greater than the (OWL) associated
with smuggling.

In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement

(15), it is clear that it is possible for firms to decide to engage

in smuggling and have the act of smuggling reduce the total social
value of exports.

If, however, the per unit revenue of smuggling

input is greater than the combined per unit value of: 1) the legal
trade revenue alternative for (S); 2) expected punishment; and 3)
the risk premium, then smuggling increases the social value of
exports. We can now assert that statement (20) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for risk averse firms to engage in smuggling
and increase the total social value of exports over the non
smuggling alternative.

If condition (20) holds, the welfare effect of smuggling by

risk averse firms is positive. This result occurs because both the
(DPR) and (Y) increase.

Income increases because the total social

value of exports in the presence of smuggling is greater than the

non-smuggling alternative.

If (20) is not true, then the welfare

effect of smuggling is ambiguous.

case mirror the risk neutral case.

The results of the risk averse

The next welfare issue to be addressed is when smuggling and
strictly legal trade coexist.

This situation is stated in (16).

The coexistence of the two types of trade can only occur when if
18

[P*

=

pl+w*/ (L+S)].

This implies that the law of one price breaks

down and allows a type of parallel market structure to develop.
The (DPR) is now composed of a weighted average of (P*) and (pL). 20
The effect on the total social value of exports for this case
is again determined by (20).

Condition (20) reveals that the total

social value of exports, if firms smuggle, is less than the total
social value of exports for the legal trade alternative.
welfare result for this case is ambiguous:

The

The (DPR) increases and

income declines and therefore the welfare effect of smuggling is
ambiguous when smuggling coexists with strictly legal trade.

This

result implies the "less smuggling the better" result of Bhagwati
and Hansen does not hold when firms are risk averse.
The next issue to be addressed is the effect of increased
enforcement

on

smuggling

and

welfare.

starting

with

the

assumptions that there is not a significant real resource cost
associated with smuggling and firms are risk neutral, increased
enforcement will have a negative effect on the (DPR) if (p•F < t),
and eliminate smuggling when the level of expected punishment
becomes greater than the export tax. 21

Equation (8) and condition

(12) verify the last statement: 1) if enforcement is increased,
This type of parallel market structure is type of market
structure which develops in many lesser developed countries when
smuggling is present.
The development of this type of market
structure is discussed in the empirical paper by Cooper (1974) and
the theoretical paper by Fausti (1992).
20

The following partial derivatives derived from equation 8:
ap*I a p I ap*I aF, are negative. However, the indirect affects due to
changes in the enforcement variables on L and s are ambiguous.
Therefore, I will assume the direct effect dominates.
21

19

then {P*) declines as equation (8) indicates; and 2) if the value
of {P*) declines below {pL), then condition {12) states that all
smuggling will end. Under the "no real cost" assumption, increased
enforcement has a negative impact on welfare due to its negative
effect of the {DPR).
Relaxing the "no real cost" assumption, the welfare effect of
smuggling is shown to be either ambiguous or strictly positive.
The welfare result is dependent on the real resource cost, the
value of expected punishment and the risk premium {,r*=o).

The

welfare effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous {negative) if
the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous {positive).

Relaxing

the assumption of risk neutrality, for the risk averse case, when
smuggling has a positive {ambiguous) impact on welfare, the welfare
effect of increased enforcement is negative (ambiguous)•

The

policy conclusion concerning increased enforcement to reduce
smuggling in this paper contradicts the policy conclusion of the
"the less smuggling the better" found in the earlier literature.
The results derived in this paper cast doubt on the economic
welfare argument for the eradication of smuggling which was the
implied policy conclusion in the earlier literature.
The next issue to be discussed is the results contained in a
paper by Sheikh (1989).

Sheikh argues that the ambiguous welfare

results derived in the earlier literature are the direct result of
smugglers being risk preferring. This paper's model demonstrates
that when the presence of smuggling results in an ambiguous welfare
outcome, it is due to the assumption of a large real resource cost,
20

not to the assumption of risk preferring behavior by firms. 22
Sheikh also asserts that incorporating risk by itself lowers
welfare and thus all previous models over-predict the positive
impact of smuggling on welfare.

This assertion is only true when

However, it is not the inclusion of risk,

firms are risk averse.

but the assumption of risk aversion that lowers welfare.

This

point is discussed next.
The final issue to be discussed is the long run equilibrium
results of the model.

This paper examined two firm risk preference

states: 1) risk averse firms; and 2) risk neutral firms.

The

results of the model demonstrate that long run equilibrium profit
and (DPR) are effected by the state of nature assumed about firm
risk preference.

In the risk neutral case, long run economic

profit is equal to zero.

The long run domestic price ratio is

composed of a weighted average of

(P5 )

and

(PL).

Under the

assumption of firm risk aversion, long run economic profit is
positive.

However, it is assumed that (11*) represents compensation

for the mental anguish suffered by firms due to the risk associated
with smuggling.

Thus, excessive profit in the non-competitive

sense is not being earned.

Comparing the two states, the long run

equilibrium (DPR) is lower for the risk averse state.

The risk

averse state, therefore, reduces welfare when compared to the risk
neutral state.

However, under both states of nature it is possible

for smuggling to have a strictly positive effect on welfare.

The

It should be noted that an excessive real resource cost will
cause all smuggling to end this paper's model.
22

21

state of nature effect in this model is consistent with the trade
literature on uncertainty. 23

For a discussion of the effect of uncertainty on prices,
output, and welfare see Batra (1975) .
23

22

V. Summary.
A general equilibrium

joint product

model of smuggling

incorporating features found in the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen,
The results of the paper

and Pitt was presented in this paper.

indicate that: 1) a significant real resource cost will preclude
smuggling activity from occurring; 2) if smuggling begins, it can
have a strictly positive welfare effect when compared to the legal
trade alternative; 3) firms that smuggle can coexist with firms
that engage in strictly legal trade and if firms are risk averse
the

welfare

effect of smuggling is

ambiguous;

4)

increased

enforcement against smuggling can have a negative welfare effect;
and 5) the real resource cost, expected punishment, and firm risk
preference all play a role in determining the welfare effect of
smuggling.
In

conclusion,

the

presence

of

smuggling

is

just

a

manifestation of the economic reality that a tariff is a second
best commercial policy instrument and should be avoided when
formulating commercial policy goals.

The answer to the smuggling

problem is not increased enforcement, but the replacement of the
tariff with a more suitable commercial policy instrument.
VI. Appendix (A).
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation
(7) are,

aY/aL =
aY1as =

(1-p ·F) ·P f ·Gi. + pf ·(l-t) - p* =
c1-p ·F> ·Pf ·G. - p*

= o.

o,

(la)
(2a)

23

The term (Pt), is the fixed international terms of trade and
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate.

First order conditions (la)

and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit of

tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or
illegal trade.

An additional unit of legal trade will result in

additional legal revenue Pf • (l-t) and additional smuggling revenue
(1-p •F) •Pf ·Gi.·

24
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